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1. IntroductIon
As other papers in this issue document and explain, corporate mul-
tinationalization  –once  the  privilege  of  companies  in  developed 
economies– is now becoming a diffuse phenomenon in emerging 
economies, including Latin America. Latin America is now home to 
some of the most internationally-oriented oil companies: PDVSA, in 
particular, has long been ranked among the world-largest multinatio-
nal companies (MNCs) from developing countries (UNCTAD 2008). 
This study analyzes the emergence of a leading Latin MNC, Petro-
bras, whose development has garnered substantial attention in both 
business and policy circles abroad. There are various reasons why 
studying the tenth most valuable company in the world (at end-July 
20092) is important for advancing our understanding of multilatinas3. 
The first reason is that the oil sector has traditionally been one of 
the most global in terms of trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) 
flows and that analyzing the growth and development of oil MNCs is 
therefore crucial for analyzing changes in the geography of interna-
tional business. In fact, “it was in petroleum that some of the world’s 
largest [MNCs] were to develop” (Jones 2005, p. 47); in 2006, there 
were four oil companies among the world’s top eight non-financial 
MNCs, ranked by foreign assets (UNCTAD 2008, Table A.I.15). 
The second reason is the industry’s relatively strong long-term dy-
namism (Maugeri 2006). Between 1928 and 1973, seven large ver-UNIVERSIA BUSINESS REVIEW | pRImER cUAtRImEStRE 2010 | ISSN: 1698-5117
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper examines the history of Petrobras and its multinational expansion. The Petrobras 
experience confirms that the rise of emerging economies is leading to a transformation in 
global business in which foreign direct investment is driven not only by the exploitation of 
traditional firm-specific competencies (although, at least in the case of Petrobras, these are 
far from minor) but also by the exploration of new patterns of organizational innovation and 
ways of accessing markets.
RESUMEN DEL ARTÍCULO  
Este trabajo examina la historia de Petrobras y su expansión internacional. La experiencia 
de Petrobras confirma que el crecimiento de las economías en desarrollo esta llevando a la 
transformación de los negocios internacional en los que la inversión directa en el extranjero 
esta motivada no solo por la explotación de las competencias de la empresa (aunque en el 
caso de Petrobras estas no son pocas) sino también por la exploración de nuevas pautas 
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tically-integrated MNCs (or International Oil Companies, IOCs) were 
major market players and price setters4. Later on, producing coun-
tries carried out successive nationalization processes, and by 1973, 
they controlled most of their oil production. Some of these countries 
(including Ecuador and Venezuela in Latin America) formed the Or-
ganization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to coordi-
nate and unify petroleum policies, in order to secure fair and stable 
prices for petroleum producers; an efficient, economic and regular 
supply of petroleum to consuming nations; and a fair return on capi-
tal to those investing in the industry. The Seven Sisters’ share of the 
world’s oil trade fell from about 70per cent in 1970 to around 50per 
cent by 1980. 
State-owned  national  oil  companies  (NOCs)  have  increased  their 
share of worldwide hydrocarbon resource endowments, as well as 
many of the major oil and gas infrastructure systems. Petrobras is 
one such NOC: a powerful organization within the state apparatus 
that addresses a number of non-commercial aspirations (such as 
employment generation and price controls), in common with most 
other state-owned enterprises (SOEs), but at the same time enjoys 
some managerial autonomy and is expected to perform commercia-
lly. From this a conflict often emerges in their relationship with the 
national budget – NOCs often place significant demands on public 
funds  and  compete  with  other  urgent  development  priorities,  but 
they are also a major cash cow5. Although with major variations, all 
NOCs are transforming themselves from state-dominated and bu-
reaucratic entities that rely on a monopolistic position in their home 
country  and  are  only  accountable  to  the  government,  to  at  least 
partly private-owned ones with corresponding modifications in their 
governance mechanisms. Moreover, with the acceleration of globa-
lization since the early 1990s, exclusive access to oil reserves has 
made NOCs from the South leading players in the oil market6. Some 
of them have expanded their operations globally – both upstream to 
diversify their geographical portfolio and downstream (into petroche-
micals, refineries, and distribution) to reach consumers directly. Ac-
cess to capital, technology and knowledge are driving forces behind 
these ventures. While such transformation has brought made the 
NOCs closer to IOCs, marked differences persist in other key areas, 
notably issues of sovereignty and the role that the oil sector can play 
in developing and sustaining national economies (Khelil 2008). 
How do all these different factors play out in the case of Petrobras? ANdREA goLdStEIN
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The first objective of the paper is to provide a descriptive account of 
the company’s evolution and of the underlying drivers – the shaping 
of governance and internal organization, the evolution of innovation 
and technological capability. The historical context (the relationships 
between the companies and their respective governments, as well 
as between the latter and authorities in countries where they invest) 
is necessary for providing a clear background to the environment 
out of which the NOCs have developed. The analysis of the inter-
nationalization of Petrobras describes worldwide spread across re-
gions and activities and also other dimensions such as the extent of 
foreign exposure among executive managers. In the fourth section 
the peculiarities of Petrobras as a corporate actor, especially the po-
litical economy of its recent growth, are explored.
2. HIstory, governance and tecHnology
Petrobras was founded in 1953, making it one of the oldest NOCs 
worldwide. It formed a lynchpin of the Estado Novo’s inward-orien-
ted industrialization drive of the time. Under the terms of Law No. 
2,004, Petrobras was granted sole rights over domestic upstream oil 
exploration and production (E&P). It also came to dominate domes-
tic refining activity, although the major foreign oil firms were allowed 
to retain a role in the downstream distribution sector. In the 1960s 
Petrobras further diversified into petrochemicals, partly to kick-start 
the growth of this dynamic new industry in Brazil, partly to prevent 
foreign MNCs from dominating it (Trebat 1983). 
In the 1990s, in particular under President Cardoso, Brazil embra-
ced the so-called Washington Consensus in economic policy-ma-
king and embarked in an ambitious program of SOEs’ privatization 
and market liberalization (Goldstein 1999). Petrobras has operated 
in  a  competitive  environment  since  1997,  when  the  government 
scrapped its monopoly on oil-related activities, freed oil prices from 
state control, and opened the sector to competition. It completed the 
process in January 2002 by abolishing price controls and removing 
Petrobras’s monopoly on importing oil products. The principal gover-
nment agency charged with monitoring the oil sector is the National 
Petroleum Agency (ANP), which holds responsibility for issuing E&P 
licenses and ensuring compliance with relevant regulations. 
On 9 August 2000, Petrobras issued US$4.3 billion in an IPO in Bra-
zil and in the New York Stock Exchange. For the first time in Brazil, 
shares were offered not only to institutional investors, but also to re-thE EmERgENcE of mULtILAtINAS: thE pEtRoBRAS ExpERIENcE
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tail investors through the banking network. More than 400,000 Brazi-
lians and an unknown number of foreign individuals and institutions 
bought shares. The government controls Petrobras with a 55.7 per 
cent voting stake, but it owns only 33.2 per cent of the company’s to-
tal shares (39.80 per cent including BNDESPar). Although the board 
is currently chaired by the chief-of-staff of President Lula, Petrobras 
operates rather independently from government and raises private 
financing through project finance. 
Petrobras oil and gas production has grown very fast over the past 
few years – both in Brazil and overseas (Table 1). These recent ad-
vances are a result of considerable effort made by Petrobras in order 
to face the challenges of deep and ultra-deep water environments, 
heavy oil production and High Pressure/High Temperature (HPHT) 
reservoirs (Pessôa et al. 2006). As Acha and Finch (2005) note, “par-
ticularly in the 1980s and 1990s, the success of Petrobras’ expertise 
and technology in the geoscience and engineering of deepwater has 
been underscored by drilling milestones and technology awards”. Its 
research center (Centro de Pesquisas e Desenvolvimento Leopol-
do A. Miguez de Mello, CENPES), established in Rio de Janeiro in 
1966, has provided an environment for research, innovation and de-
Table 1. Key corporate data
1999 2002 2005 2008
Financial
Total assets 33,733 32,154 78,638
Total revenues 23,467 32,987 56,234
Total net income 727 2,311 10,344 18,879
Capital and exploratory 
expenses 4,351 4,911 10,635
Operating
Oil production (‘000 bpd) 422 542 643 1,979
Natural gas production 
(‘000 boed) 263 495 741 421
Oil reserves (billion 
barrels) 8,279 8,955 9,716 12,508
Natural gas reserves 7,498 9,473 12,352
Sources: Oil and Gas Journal and company.ANdREA goLdStEIN
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velopment (Mansoori et al. 2001). Petrobras has set a number of 
world records, including, at one point, the record for the world’s dee-
pest exploration well (2,853 m in the Roncador field)7. Since 1992, 1 
per cent of Petrobras gross receipts have been earmarked for R&D. 
This genuine effort at developing internal technological competen-
cies has allowed Petrobras to extract the full potential from coope-
rative R&D to gain access to the new subsea boosting technology. 
Petrobras has won the OTC award twice (1992 and 2001) for “ex-
cellence in deep water operations”. Its 2007/08 R&D expenditures 
are similar to those of BP and Shell and well in excess of those of 
comparable US- and EU-based IOCs (Exxon, Chevron and Conoco 
and Total, ENI and RepsolYPF, respectively) (Goldstein 2009, Table 
2). These efforts have resulted in 172 USPTO patents since 1976 – 
which compares with nine for CNPC/Petrochina, the world’s largest 
company by market capitalization (see footnote 1).
The national relevance of Petrobras technology has taken a new di-
mension since the April 2006 announcement that Brazil has become 
self-sufficient in oil supply, after the opening of a major ultra-dee-
pwater exploration platform in the Campos Basin. The discovery of 
the Tupi oil field off the Southeastern coast in November 2007, the 
biggest in the world since a discovery in Kazakhstan in 2000, has 
the potential to transform Brazil into a global energy powerhouse. To 
coax the oil from Tupi field, Petrobras’ engineers will have to drill up 
to 4,800 meters below the sea floor through salt and rocks, in water 
depths of up to 3,000 meters, an undertaking that is at the frontier of 
the industry’s technological ability.
3. InternatIonal expansIon
Multinationalization (in order to spread technical and political risk) 
is a natural stage in the development of companies in an oligopo-
listic industry (Graham 1998). Petrobras’s long history of internatio-
nal expansion started with the creation of Braspetro in 1972. At the 
time, oil imports covered more than 80 per cent of domestic demand 
and Petrobras’ international branch had as its main purpose to gua-
rantee  supply  security. The  first  investments  were  made  in  Iraq9, 
Colombia’s Caribbean Sea, Angola (1979), and the Gulf of Mexico, 
where Petrobras currently owns more than 300 deepwater blocs. 
Nowadays, Petrobras holds more than 100 production licenses in 27 
countries in Latin America (Argentina and Venezuela), Gulf of Mexi-
co, and Africa (Angola, Nigeria, Tanzania, Libya). The Bolivia pipeli-thE EmERgENcE of mULtILAtINAS: thE pEtRoBRAS ExpERIENcE
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ne strengthened gas business in the Southern Cone. Argentina has 
become the second most important market for Petrobras following 
the Perez Companc acquisition in 2002. Moreover, overseas refi-
ning capacity has gone from zero barrels in 2000 to 126.2 thousand 
barrels of oil per day in 2007 (Petrobras 2008). Reserves outside 
Brazil were less than 12 per cent in 2002, to rise to 17 per cent by 
2010 (Carvalho and Goldstein 2009). According to its 2009-13 stra-
tegic plans, Petrobras expects to realize overseas investments of 
US$15.9 billion in both exploration and production, along with the 
expansion of international biofuels production, mostly biodiesel and 
ethanol. 
UNCTAD  transnationalization  index  captures  the  foreign 
dimension of MNC activities by averaging three ratios: fo-
reign assets to total assets, foreign sales to total sales, and 
foreign employment to total employment. For Petrobras, its 
value has grown from 7 in 1999 to 16 in 2007 – still lower 
than for IOCs and Petronas, but higher than for CNPC. The 
financial and corporate governance dimension of internatio-
nalization is equally important, although its study is not as 
well  developed.  Following  Hassel  et  al.  (2003),  three  va-
riables which might be useful for measuring this dimension 
are Foreign Ownership as Percentage of Total Ownership 
(FOTO), the number of listings in foreign stock exchanges 
(FSE), and the presence of foreign board members (FBM). For Pe-
trobras, FOTO and FSE show levels in line with IOCs such as ENI 
and Shell. In the case of directors and managers, on the other hand, 
at Petrobras all of them are Brazilian. In fact most oil companies 
seem to prefer nationals, with Shell being an exception with its very 
international profile (Goldstein 2009). Zooming on the foreign expe-
rience of top management, the President of Petrobras has a PhD in 
Economics from Boston University, but otherwise Petrobras senior 
management is not very international in terms of education (at Pe-
tronas of Malaysia, for instance, seven of the top nine managers for 
which this background is available have a foreign degree)10.
How to make sense of these broad phenomena? The starting point 
is that NOC executives’ ambitions are no different from those of their 
IOC counterparts (Grayson 1981). Diversification in downstream ac-
tivities such as petrochemicals, refineries, and distribution and inter-
national expansion serve to increase managerial autonomy and se-
cure technical and financial independence. For Petrobras producing 
Multinationalization 
(in order to spread 
technical and political 
risk) is a natural stage 
in the development 
of companies in an 
oligopolistic industryANdREA goLdStEIN
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and exploring for oil in a variety of different places around the world 
diversifies  risk  and  lowers  international  financing  costs  (Amman 
2009). If Petrobras buys a second U.S. refinery, it will have an asset 
that generates hard currency and lowers its financial risk. Also, ge-
nerating revenues in U.S. dollars gives Petrobras the cash to pay off 
its debt obligations abroad and increase its credit rating.
Thanks to the success in both finding and extracting oil in Brazil and 
in developing ethanol technology, energy security is a less impor-
tant motivation for Petrobras than for other non-OPEC NOCs such 
as China’s and India’s. On the other hand, competitive pressures to 
internationalize act more strongly on Petrobras’ management. Until 
1997, Petrobras had the monopoly of exploration in the Brazilian te-
rritory but since the opening of the domestic market nine concession 
rounds have been conducted and 71 concessionaires (35 of which 
foreign investors) are currently operating in the Brazilian offshore. 
Given this reduced scope for deploying  its core competencies at 
home, it is not surprising that Petrobras has ventured further over-
seas (Amman 2009). In addition, Petrobras does not have much idle 
refining capacity left; it is now refining 1.7 million barrels of its 2 mi-
llion barrels-per-day capacity. More refining abroad and the planned 
construction of a lubricants factory in Cuba through a joint venture 
with PDVSA and Cubapetroleo would allow Petrobras to refine oil 
that the company will, in the near future, have trouble processing in 
Brazil. Selling the output from such a refinery would also generate 
additional hard currency in dollars.
4. petrobras and tHe polItIcal economy of oIl fdI
Oil companies choose their investments mode according to three 
considerations:  technical  capabilities  and  (to  a  lesser  extent)  the 
compatibility of the oil in the ground with the refineries back home; 
the  intensity  of  competition;  and  an  assessment  of  political  risk 
(Aykut and Goldstein 2007). Technology is clearly key: Petrobras 
has extracted from Brazilian deep waters since 1972 and then ex-
panded  towards  other  areas  where  similar  exploration  conditions 
existed. 
The politics of NOC expansion has been a matter of great controver-
sy. Insofar as the mode of FDI in oil sector is mostly shaped by the 
government policies in the host country, attention over the past few 
years have been mostly placed on governance issues. In particular, 
many observers have pointed out that Asian and other NOCs, by thE EmERgENcE of mULtILAtINAS: thE pEtRoBRAS ExpERIENcE
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investing in strife-torn oil-producing countries where political risk or 
sentiment have frightened off many bigger players, may be hampe-
ring efforts to bring peace and security (Taylor 2006). For Petrobras, 
the ability to use Brazil’s developing country status has been impor-
tant: in June 1972 it was the first foreign firm to take Iraqi oil and 
thus break a blockade against Iraq called by BP after the nationali-
zation of IPC; in Angola, it has taken advantage of the fact that Bra-
zil had been the first country to recognize the new government after 
independence.  Nonetheless,  sometimes  political  friendship  is  not 
sufficient. When President Morales decided to nationalize Bolivia’s 
gas reserves, Petrobras was not spared.
An equally heated debate surrounds the contribution that oil compa-
nies can make to national development in producing countries. Na-
tural resources exploitation necessitates huge finance, technology 
and expertise resources to which IOCs have relatively easy access, 
whereas few developing countries can raise the amount of capital or 
possess crucial skills and technology. Oil FDI can also generate em-
ployment opportunities, create backward (and, more rarely, forward) 
linkages locally and contribute to infrastructure development. Howe-
Table 2. CSR uptake – Petrobras vs. selected competitors
COvALEnCE 
EthiCAL 
RAnKinG Q1 2009
(RAnKinG 
AmOnG OiL AnD 
GAS 
COmPAniES)
2009 GLObAL 
REPutAtiOn 
PuLSE
(RAnKinG 
AmOnG OiL 
AnD GAS 
COmPAniES)
Eiti 
PRinCiPLES 
AnD 
CRitERiA
2008 REPORt 
On REvEnuE 
tRAnSPAREnCy 
OF OiL AnD GAS 
COmPAniES A
Petrobras 3 1 Endorsed High
Selected NOCs
CNPC n.a. n.a. Nor endorsed Low
ONGC n.a. n.a. Nor endorsed Low
Petronas n.a. n.a. Nor endorsed Low
Selected IOCs
ENI 20 6 Endorsed Middle
Shell 25 n.a. Endorsed HighANdREA goLdStEIN
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ver, the experience of resource-rich developing countries indicates 
that this type of wealth can be a mixed blessing (Sachs and Warner 
1995). The extraction of non-renewable resources may have adver-
se social or environmental costs. The oil boom may also widen inco-
me inequalities, imperil good governance and aggravate corruption. 
Also, extractive industries may exacerbate the negative consequen-
ces of macroeconomic mismanagement: the presence of mining will 
inflate wages and keep the exchange rate strong, which can prevent 
other  sectors,  for  example,  agriculture,  from  being  internationally 
competitive and thus from realizing the opportunity for export-driven 
growth. 
Over the past few years, various initiatives have been taken to en-
hance the role that MNCs play in the long-term planning of a host 
country’s natural resources, to ensure better alignment between pri-
vate agents’ actions and the national economic development agenda 
and good-quality governance, and to enact and implement correct 
regulations and codes. Virtually every company has developed gui-
delines for staff on how to behave when confronted with dilemmas 
such as conflict of interests, gifts, theft, insider trading, pay-offs and 
bribery. The ultimate aim is to embed international markets and firms 
in a framework of global rules and norms by establishing standards 
for responsible business conduct and corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) as well as mechanisms for promoting compliance with them.
As Table 2 shows, there are obvious differences in response bet-
ween  companies,  with  the Asian  NOCs  performing  rather  poorly 
and Petrobras being on a par with some IOCs, when not above. In 
line with the results of a study of ExxonMobil, Shell, BP, and (then) 
TotalFinaElf (Skjærseth et al. 2004), these differences can be ex-
plained by a combination of company-specific features and different 
home-base countries: in the case of Petrobras, the fact that foreign 
exchange listing exposes it to enhanced stakeholders’ scrutiny and 
more generally the spread of a CSR culture in Brazil (Araya 2006). 
At any rate, considerable skepticism surrounds CSR, particularly at 
the rhetorical level, which companies themselves see as a tool to 
achieve compliance with mandatory social and environmental legis-
lation, in particular with regard to climate change and bribery, rather 
than to make efforts that go beyond minimal formal requirements 
(Boasson et al. 2006).thE EmERgENcE of mULtILAtINAS: thE pEtRoBRAS ExpERIENcE
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5. conclusIons
This paper has documented the strategic trajectory of the growth 
and internationalization of Petrobras. Its recent accelerated develo-
pment is impressive by all means, especially in terms of the con-
siderable efforts to enhance management qualifications, moderni-
ze internal and external governance, and improve the science and 
technology base. Petrobras’ story shows the crucial importance of 
accumulating technological capabilities to establish a leading inter-
national position. As Dantas and Bell (2006: 9) stress, Petrobras’s 
capabilities “evolved from those of an imitative technology-user to 
those  of  a  leading  player  at  the  international  innovation  frontier”. 
Strategic intent was the key, together with the continuous evolution 
in the properties of Petrobras’ knowledge networks to build greater 
complementarities with its partners (Dantas and Bell 2009). 
What  lessons  does  the  analysis  of  Petrobras  generate  for  policy 
makers and managers? The Petrobras experience confirms that the 
rise of emerging economies is leading to a transformation in global 
business (Goldstein 2007 and Guillén and García-Canal 2009). A 
new type of multinational enterprises is emerging in which foreign 
direct investment is driven not only by the exploitation of traditional 
firm-specific competencies (although, at least in the case of Petro-
bras, these are far from minor) but also by the exploration of new 
patterns of organizational innovation and ways of accessing mar-
kets. The latter include valuable capabilities developed in the home 
country,  such  as  project-execution,  and  political  and  networking 
skills.  In  the  case  of  Petrobras,  the  further  accumulation  of  such 
resources depends on finding the right balance between corporate 
autonomy, state support, and contribution to national development. 
Especially in the new circumstances of the oil industry in Brazil and 
with the prospects of a huge bonanza, this calls for continued poli-
tical dialogue on the complex issues raised by extractive industries 
and their contribution to socio-economic development objectives.ANdREA goLdStEIN
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